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The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Airborne Corps would likely play an important role in a cross-strait invasion through operations behind enemy lines. During the landing campaign, the Corps would conduct paradrops or landing operations onto Taiwan, facilitated by PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft. Once on island, airborne forces would seize and hold terrain and conduct a variety of operations to support the broader invasion. In recent years, the Corps has reorganized to improve its capability for mechanized maneuver and assault, leveraging the PLAAF's larger inventories of transport aircraft, particularly the Y-20; improved the sophistication of its training at home; and gleaned insights from abroad via training with foreign militaries. Nevertheless, it is uncertain to what extent the Corps is able to overcome key challenges relevant to a cross-strait campaign. These include ensuring effective integration with similar ground force and marine units; carrying out operations in complex or degraded environments; transcending the Corps' lack of relevant combat experience; and obtaining adequate air support. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1018/thumbnail.jpg

"This report is based on RAND Project AIR FORCE Strategy and Doctrine Program research that was presented at the second China Aerospace Studies Institute conference, sponsored by Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. It took place on May 2, 2016, at the RAND Corporation's Washington office in Arlington, Va. Experts on airpower, military operations, and Chinese military modernization participated in the conference and provided valuable feedback to the report's authors. The four resulting reports assess notable developments and implications of China's emerging aerospace expeditionary and power-projection capabilities. As China's economic, diplomatic, and security interests continue to expand, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and, in particular, its aerospace forces (including its air force, naval aviation, and space capabilities) will require more robust power projection and expeditionary capabilities on par with China's expanding global footprint. In addition to traditional security concerns (e.g., Taiwan and maritime territorial disputes), such issues as countering terrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and sea-lane protection have now become factors in the PLA's training, doctrine, and modernization efforts. Command of space — including the military use of outer space — is also of increasing interest to the PLA as it seeks to develop new capabilities and operating concepts to support its growing range of military missions. This report focuses on the PLA Air Force's initial steps toward becoming an expeditionary air force, a development that will have important implications for the reach of China's military and its ability to protect China's emerging overseas interests."--Publisher's description

"Premeditated war between the United States and China is very unlikely, but the danger that a mishandled crisis could trigger hostilities cannot be ignored. Thus, while neither state wants war, both states' militaries have plans to fight one. As Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities improve, the United States can no longer be so certain that war would follow its plan and lead to decisive victory. This analysis illuminates various paths a war with China could take and their possible consequences. Technological advances in the ability to target opposing forces are creating conditions of conventional counterforce, whereby each side has the means to strike and degrade the other's forces and, therefore, an incentive to do so promptly, if not first. This implies fierce early exchanges, with steep military losses on both sides, until one gains control. At present, Chinese losses would greatly exceed U.S. losses, and the gap would only grow as fighting persisted. But, by 2025, that gap could be much smaller. Even then, however, China could not be confident of gaining military advantage, which suggests the possibility of a prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive, war. In that event, nonmilitary factors--economic costs, internal political effects, and international reactions--could become more important. Political leaders on both sides could limit the severity of war by ordering their respective militaries to refrain from swift and massive conventional counterforce attacks. The resulting restricted, sporadic fighting could substantially reduce military losses and economic harm. This possibility underscores the importance of firm civilian control over wartime decisionmaking and of communication between capitals. At the same time, the United States can prepare for a long and severe war by reducing its vulnerability to Chinese A2AD forces and developing plans to ensure that economic and international consequences would work to its advantage"--Back cover

"The administration of President Donald Trump pursued an enhanced-and, in some ways, novel-set of policies designed to confront China over its transgressive and anticompetitive economic behaviors, such as theft of technology and intellectual property and limitations on market access for U.S. businesses. How did the U.S. business community view these policies, and did it broadly support increased U.S. efforts to counter problematic Chinese economic behavior? If not, how could the U.S. government implement policy to better achieve policy goals while also addressing corporate concerns? In this report, the authors address these questions, which are central to determining whether the U.S. government has crafted an overall economic strategy or approach toward China that is sustainable and feasible. How the business community thinks the United States should deal with China is an overlooked and underappreciated topic, and the United States might find it difficult to compete against China without support from the business community. The authors assess how the U.S. business community-focusing on the manufacturing, technology, and financial sectors-viewed the Trump administration's China policies through several different lenses: from the perspective of individuals, from the perspective of different firms over time, and from the perspective of specific industry sectors and subsectors. The analysis focuses on Trump administration actions toward China from 2017 through fall 2020."